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When people make decisions, do they give equal weight to evidence arriving at different
times? A recent study (Kiani et al., 2008) using brief motion pulses (superimposed on a
random moving dot display) reported a primacy effect: pulses presented early in a motion
observation period had a stronger impact than pulses presented later. This observation
was interpreted as supporting the bounded diffusion (BD) model and ruling out models in
which evidence accumulation is subject to leakage or decay of early-arriving information.
We use motion pulses and other manipulations of the timing of the perceptual evidence
in new experiments and simulations that support the leaky competing accumulator (LCA)
model as an alternative to the BD model. While the LCA does include leakage, we show
that it can exhibit primacy as a result of competition between alternatives (implemented
via mutual inhibition), when the inhibition is strong relative to the leak. Our experiments
replicate the primacy effect when participants must be prepared to respond quickly at the
end of a motion observation period.With less time pressure, however, the primacy effect
is much weaker. For 2 (out of 10) participants, a primacy bias observed in trials where
the motion observation period is short becomes weaker or reverses (becoming a recency
effect) as the observation period lengthens. Our simulation studies show that primacy is
equally consistent with the LCA or with BD. The transition from primacy-to-recency can
also be captured by the LCA but not by BD. Individual differences and relations between
the LCA and other models are discussed.
Keywords: bounded diffusion, LCA, perceptual choice, non-stationary evidence, order effects
INTRODUCTION
The process of decision making has been the subject of intensive
recent investigations in both experimental psychology (Usher and
McClelland, 2001; Ratcliff and Smith, 2004; Brown and Heath-
cote, 2005; Bogacz et al., 2006; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; van
Ravenzwaaij et al., 2012) and neuroscience (Huk and Shadlen,
2005; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff et al., 2007; Wong et al.,
2007; Wang, 2008; Ditterich, 2010; Rorie et al., 2010). A central
idea emerging from these investigations is that decision makers
take multiple samples of noisy evidence and integrate them over
time until the integrated evidence reaches a decision boundary.
The time to reach the bound determines the reaction time (Gold
and Shadlen, 2001, 2002; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). Some
of these decision making models generate optimal decisions in
the sense that they achieve the shortest possible mean reaction
time for a ﬁxed error-rate (Wald, 1946; Gold and Shadlen, 2001,
2002; Bogacz et al., 2006). In addition, neurophysiological stud-
ies have reported that when monkeys make decisions about the
direction of motion in a noisymoving dots display, neurons in sev-
eral visual-motor integration areas (e.g., the lateral intraparietal
cortex, LIP) show ramping activity consistent with the integra-
tion of evidence (Hanes and Schall, 1996; Gold and Shadlen,
2000, 2001; Horwitz and Newsome, 2001; Shadlen and Newsome,
2001).
A number of computational models that can account for both
the behavioral and physiological choice data have been developed.
These models not only account for the accuracy of participants’
responses, but also for details of the distributions of response times
and their dependence on experiment conditions such as difﬁ-
culty levels and speed-accuracy instructions (Ratcliff andMcKoon,
2008).
The starting point for a wide range of decisionmaking research
is the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff and Rouder,
1998; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). In this model, the difference
in evidence supporting each of two decision-alternatives is accu-
mulated linearly over time, without loss or distortion. Here we
consider a variant of thismodel that is often used to address neuro-
physiological data (Mazurek et al., 2003; Figure 1B). This model is
represented as a process inwhich accumulators integrate the differ-
ence in themomentary evidence for the two alternatives via a com-
bination of feed-forward excitation and inhibition, such that pos-
itive evidence for one alternative is negative evidence for the other.
In recent years, several researchers have proposeddecisionmak-
ing models that do not adhere to the perfect integration of the
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FIGURE 1 | Architecture of the two-choice reaction-time models.
(A)The leaky competing accumulator model (Usher and McClelland, 2001),
(B) Mazurek et al. (2003) model. Arrows and ﬁlled circles indicate excitatory
and inhibitory connections respectively. Blue tears indicate leakage.
drift-diffusion model. These models include variations based on
the Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Roe
et al., 2001; Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005), the neurophysiologi-
cally grounded attractor network model (Wang, 2002; Wong and
Wang, 2006) and the leaky competing accumulator model (LCA;
Usher and McClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al., 2007). To varying
degrees, all of these models draw on inspiration from princi-
ples of neural computation and attempt to capture ways in which
decision making deviates from perfect optimality. For example,
these models incorporate the possibility of leakage or decay of
information, as well as mutual inhibition between the representa-
tions of the decision-alternatives, and both the attractor and LCA
models incorporate non-linearities that can affect information
integration.
In the present workwe focus primarily on the LCA (Figure 1A).
In this model, as in the model of Mazurek et al. (2003), accu-
mulators representing the available alternatives accumulate noisy
evidence over time, but in this case, there is no feed-forward inhi-
bition. Instead, accumulated evidence is subject to leak, and the
accumulators competewith each other throughmutual inhibition.
The LCA has been successful in capturing a number of features of
human decision making data (Usher and McClelland, 2001, 2004;
Bogacz et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2011; Tsetsos et al., 2011). This
model is intermediate in complexity between the other models;
it introduces a lower bound on activation, unlike the decision
ﬁeld theory, but it lacks additional features that are present in the
attractor model, including an activity dependent gating of special
channels that change its leakage characteristics.We retain the lower
bound at 0 because it has important implications for aspects of the
dynamics of decision making that have already received support
in another recent study (Tsetsos et al., 2011). As we shall see, this
lower bound will also play a role in understanding the ﬁndings
we will present in the present article. The greater simplicity of the
LCA compared to the attractormodel (Wang, 2002)makes it more
tractable for analysis, and this is one of the prime reasons for our
focus on the LCA.We are open, however, to the possibility that the
added features of the attractor model may be important, and we
will return to this class of models in the Section “Discussion.”
Research on decision making often employs what is called the
free-response paradigm, which sets up decision-time under the
control of the observer. In this paradigm, a stimulus is presented
on each trial, and participants are assumed to integrate evidence
until they reach a decision bound. All of the models under con-
sideration assume that this bound represents a criterion amount
of accumulated evidence. However, the models differ in their han-
dling of decision making in time-controlled paradigms, in which
evidence is presented for a period of time controlled by the exper-
imenter, and in which the overt response is prompted by a cue
called a go cue. When difﬁcult stimuli are used in such experi-
ments, stimulus sensitivity (measured by d ′) is 0 with very short
evidence accumulation times, then rises to a ﬁnite asymptotic level
after about 1 s, remaining constant even if more integration time
is allowed (Wickelgren, 1977; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Kiani
et al., 2008). The LCA and the diffusion model have different ways
of addressing this ﬁnding. In the LCA and relatedmodels, evidence
accumulation is assumed to continue until the end of the evidence
evaluation period, at which point the decisionmaker is thought to
choose the alternative associated with the most active accumula-
tor. The fact that accuracy levels off is attributed to an imbalance
between leak and inhibition, as discussed in more detail below. In
contrast, in theMazurek et al. version of the drift-diffusionmodel,
decision sensitivity can increasewithout bound as integration time
increases, since there is no loss or distortion in evidence accu-
mulation; the model predicts that the signal to noise ratio should
increase with
√
t . To address the fact that performance levels off in
time-controlled paradigms, Mazurek et al. (2003) proposed that,
just as in free-response paradigms, participants employ a decision
bound in time-controlled situations, such that evidence integra-
tion stops when the boundary is reached, even though stimulus
input continues and the response must be withheld until a cue to
respond is presented (see also Ratcliff, 2006). Because of the pres-
ence of this decision bound, even in time-controlled situations, we
call this model the bounded diffusion (BD)model in the remainder
of this article.
In a recent paper (Kiani et al., 2008), the authors proposed a
way to determine whether the leveling off of accuracy in time-
controlled paradigms is more consistent with the presence of a
bound, or alternatively with leaky integration. The paper consid-
ered the BD model and what they referred to as the leaky accu-
mulation model, a variant of the LCA in which leakage is stronger
than inhibition (henceforth called the leak-dominant LCA). The
leaky accumulation model predicts that late information is more
important (a pattern called recency) since early information has
more time to leak away. This contrasts with the BD model, which
predicts that early information ismore important (a pattern called
primacy) because late information is more likely to arrive after the
bound is reached and therefore to be ignored.
Two pieces of evidence were shown to support the primacy
pattern in the experiment. The ﬁrst was based on the reverse cor-
relation technique. The reverse correlation analysis is applied to
experimental trials in which the evidence (in the form of dot
motion) is completely random. Trials are grouped according to
the observed response choice between the two available alter-
natives, which we will label A and B. The analysis examines the
averaged input signal in the time course of the entire trial in the
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two groups. If the analysis reveals no difference between the A and
B groups at some time points, it means that inputs at those time
points do not contribute to the outcome. On the other hand, if
the analysis reveals a large difference between the two groups of
trials at some time points, it means inputs at those time points
are contributing to determining the response. When this analysis
was applied to model simulations, it conﬁrmed that the BDmodel
predicts a primacy pattern while the leaky accumulation model
predicts a recency pattern (Figure 2A). The same analysis based
on behavioral data demonstrated a primacy pattern (Figure 2B).
The second source of support for the primacy pattern was based
on a pulse perturbation study, using 200ms motion pulses that
inﬂuenced monkey’s choices in the direction of the pulse. The size
of the pulse effect was largest when the pulse was applied early in
the trial, and decreased when pulses occurred later, consistent with
BD rather than leaky accumulation.
In the present paper, we further examine the temporal weight-
ing of evidence in experiments and in the LCA and BD models.
Our examination is motivated by both empirical and model-
based observations presented in Usher and McClelland (2001).
On the empirical side, the result of the perturbation study in
Kiani et al. (2008) stands in contrast with experimental ﬁndings
reported in Usher and McClelland, 2001; Experiment 3). In that
experiment, participants viewed a stream of interleaved S’s and
H’s and reported after the end of the sequence which letter was
predominant. While most of the trials contained sequences with
a majority of either S or H, some of the trials contained equal
numbers of S’s and H’s. Within the latter type of trials, one of the
letters sometimes predominated early in the trial, with the other
letter predominating later. Out of the six subjects, two showed a
primacy bias, favoring the letter that predominated early in the
sequence; two showed a recency bias, favoring the latter that pre-
dominated late; and two showed approximate balance, or little bias
in either direction.
On the theoretical side, the LCA was able to account for all
three types of behavior. While the model shows a recency pat-
tern when leak is stronger than inhibition, it shows a primacy
pattern when inhibition is stronger than leak, and it shows equal
weight of early and late information when the strength of leak
and inhibition are equal. All else being equal, balanced leak, and
inhibition lead to greater accuracy, and indeed, the experimen-
tal data indicated the expected relationship between accuracy on
trials when the number of S’s and H’s were different, and the
degree of bias (either toward primacy or recency) exhibited on
trials when the number of S’s and H’s was the same. Speciﬁcally,
greater imbalance when the number of S’s and H’s was the same
FIGURE 2 | Reverse correlation analysis (reproduced from Kiani et al.,
2008). (A) Expected separation of motion energy proﬁles for rightward
(red) and leftward (blue) choices for bounded diffusion (top) and
leak-dominant LCA (bottom). Late information is more critical in the
leak-dominant LCA model while early information is more critical in the
bounded diffusion model. (B) Left, signals aligned with motion onset,
right signals aligned with motion offset. One can observe that in the data
(Panel B), the difference between the evidence that favors the response
(red) and the one that opposes it (blue) is larger at the beginning of the
choice interval.
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was associated with lower accuracy when the number of S’s and
H’s was different.
The present study seeks to examine these empirical andmodel-
based considerations further.On the empirical side, there aremany
differences between the experiments of Usher and McClelland
(2001) and Kiani et al. (2008). Among other things, Usher and
McClelland’s study involved six relatively unpracticed human par-
ticipants who were not placed under strong time pressure. Kiani et
al. used two highly practiced rhesusmacaquemonkey participants
who received a go cue (on half of their experimental trials) coin-
cident with the end of the stimulus presentation period, requiring
them to respond within 500ms. Several questions naturally arise:
Would different patterns have been observed in the Kiani et al.
study if it had been conducted on humans? Would individual dif-
ferences have emerged had a larger number of participants been
tested? Does extensive practice, or the need to be prepared to
respond quickly, alter the tendency to observe a pattern of primacy
vs. recency? The present research attempts to address these issues
by using a paradigm quite similar to that of Kiani et al. (2008),
employing highly practiced human participants, and manipulat-
ing the time pressure to respond across experiments. While our
studies still use relatively small numbers of participants, we will
see that there are indeed considerable individual differences within
the set of participants.
Another goal of our research is to further explore the pri-
macy pattern seen in some participants in both the Usher and
McClelland (2001) and Kiani et al. (2008) studies. We will exam-
ine whether the LCA can capture the primacy pattern as well as
the BD model does, and whether it can also capture other aspects
of performance that are challenging to the BD model. As we will
see, the LCA can exhibit primacy on some trials and recency on
others, using the same parameter values. That is, it can exhibit
a primacy effect when the length of the evidence accumulation
interval is short, while exhibiting a recency effect when the length
of the evidence accumulation interval is long. Our study will allow
us to examine whether such a pattern can be observed in human
participants.
We begin by reviewing an analysis of the LCA presented in
Usher and McClelland (2001), extending this analysis by further
examining the model using the same reverse correlation analysis
as in Kiani et al. We then discuss the primacy-to-recency shift that
can occur in the LCA model under certain ranges of its parameter
values. Following this, we report two experimental studies with
human observers1. In the ﬁrst we place participants under high
time pressure, using procedures similar to Kiani et al. and we ﬁnd
similar primacy patterns. In the second, we relax the time pressure
by lengthening the response window and introducing longer tri-
als, and we ﬁnd the primacy bias diminishes signiﬁcantly. We see
individual differences in both studies, with one participant in the
second study showing recency for short evidence integration peri-
ods and primacy for long integration periods. As the moving dots
paradigm is a central one to the neuroscience of decision making
(Burr and Santoro, 2001; Shadlen andNewsome, 2001; Kiani et al.,
1The data set is available at: http://www.stanford.edu/group/pdplab/projects/
Frontiers2012/.
2008), we use moving dot stimuli in our study. Our use of tempo-
rally manipulated stimuli builds on the pioneering efforts of Huk
and Shadlen (2005) and Wong et al. (2007) as well as the study of
Kiani et al. (2008).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
Moving dot stimuli
The moving dot stimuli were created following the method
described in Kiani et al. (2008). The motion stimulus consisted
of circular dots of radius 2 pixels, moving horizontally at a speed
of 5˚/s. Total dot density was 16.7 dots per degree squared per sec-
ond. The stimuluswas viewed through a circular aperture of radius
5˚. The coherence of the motion stimulus varied from trial to trial
and within trials as speciﬁed below.
Dots were randomly divided into three sets. One set of dots
was displayed per frame, which lasted 13.33ms. Each set of dots
appeared on the monitor once every frame-triple, each of which
contains three frames, spanning 50ms. On every displayed frame,
each dot had a (1 – coherence) probability of being redrawn at ran-
dom coordinates within the circular aperture. Those not redrawn
at random would be redrawn to move horizontally 5˚/s in the
direction speciﬁed for the trial. At 0% coherence, every dot would
be redrawn randomly on every frame.
Experiment 1A
In this experiment, 80% of trials with duration 300ms or greater
contained a “pulse,” or momentary change of coherence level. A
pulse consisted of a ±3.2% change in coherence level for 200ms,
or four frame-triples. The motion pulse could originate between
100ms after the beginning of the stimulus and 200ms before it
ended. See Appendix for detailed information about the pulse.
Observers. Three participants (CS, MT, and SC; two male, one
female) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were tested.
Participants CS, MT, and SC performed 32, 46, and 34 sessions
respectively. Ordinarily, successive sessions were separated by less
than 5 days, but there were some exceptions (this was also the case
for experiments 1B and 2A,B). We excluded initial sessions while
participants’ performance stabilized, excluding 5 sessions for CS,
14 for MT, and 12 for SC, leaving 27 sessions for CS, 32 sessions
for MT and 22 sessions for SC that were treated as test sessions
included in our analysis.
Procedure. In each session, participants completed 9 blocks of
100 trials. A self-paced break occurred between blocks to allow
rest. Each trial began with a ﬁxation cross at the center of the
screen. The moving dots stimulus was displayed 1000ms later.
Coherence values employed were 6.4, 12.8, 25.6, and 51.2%. Stim-
ulus duration followed an exponential distribution taking values
from 100 to 1750 with an increment of 50ms. Stimulus termina-
tion occurred simultaneously with an auditory go signal. In order
to earn points, participants had to respond by pressing the correct
key on the computer keyboard within a 300ms response window
following the go cue.
Visual and auditory feedback was used to indicate to the
participant whether the response occurred within the speciﬁed
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response interval, and (if so) whether it was correct. If partici-
pants responded within the response window and chose correctly,
they heard a pleasant noise and saw the number of total points
they earned (which increased from the previous value by 1) in
a box at the position of the ﬁxation. Incorrect, early, or too late
responses earned no points and were followed by an “X,” “Early,”
and “Too Slow” signs in the box together with an error, early, or
late tone. The total time allotted for feedback of any type was 1 s.
After the feedback time had elapsed, the ﬁxation point appeared
and the next trial began.
Experiment 1B
This experiment was carried out in order to obtain a more robust
measure of the recency-primacy bias. Instead of applying pulses
at different times of the trial as in Experiment 1A, for each coher-
ence level we created three conditions: (i) the constant condition
in which a ﬁxed non-zero coherence was used during the entire
trial, (ii) the early condition in which the coherence was one of the
four values as in Experiment 1A during the ﬁrst half of the trial
and zero during the second half, (iii) the late condition in which
the coherence was zero in the ﬁrst half and non-zero in the second
half. In addition, for the two weakest coherence levels only, we
included a switch condition, in which the coherence value stayed
constant in magnitude but the direction of motion switched in
the middle of the stimulus duration. For the constant, early, and
late conditions, the correct response was deﬁned as the response
supported by the stimulus. In the switch condition, one alternative
was designated as correct at random on each trial.
Observers. The same three participants, CS,MT, SC, from Exper-
iment 1A, participated in Experiment 1B and completed 14, 19,
and 12 sessions respectively. One session was excluded for CS and
MT due to a programming error2, and nine more sessions were
excluded for MT due to unstable performance (See Excluded Ses-
sions in Experiment 1B in Appendix). This resulted in 13, 9, and
12 analyzed sessions for CS, MT, SC respectively.
Procedure. General features of the procedure were the same as in
Experiment 1A. Coherence values were 6.4, 12.8, 25.6, and 51.2%,
except in the switch conditionwhere only 6.4 and 12.8%were used.
Stimulus duration followed an exponential distribution from 150
to 1750ms with an increment of 50ms. As in Experiment 1A the
response window was 300ms.
Experiment 2A
In this experiment, we relaxed the time pressure by using a longer
response window after the go cue and by using more long trials.
Observers. Four participants (one male, three female) with nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision were tested repeatedly in 1-h
sessions over several weeks.We obtained 16, 19, 11, and 25 sessions
for participants DG, LK, WW, and MM respectively. All sessions
were included in our analyses.
2Due to a programming error, the direction of motion in the ﬁrst half of each switch
trial was treated as correct in the ﬁrst session for participants MT and CS.
Procedure. The procedure of the experiment was the same as
Experiment 1B, except for two changes. First, the response window
after the go cue was extended from 300ms to 1 s. As in previous
experiments, if a response was made outside of the response win-
dow, no points were awarded even if the response was correct.
Second, we employed a ﬂat distribution of trial durations over the
range of 150–1750ms with an increment of 100ms.
Experiment 2B
Experiment 2B was the same as Experiment 2A except that: (i)
there were only early, late, and constant conditions (no switch)
in this experiment, (ii) the stimulus duration was sampled from
a longer range (150–2350ms, increment of 200ms), and (iii) an
adaptive procedure was used to maintain accuracy at an approx-
imately constant level across subjects. This was done by using a
baseline coherence level b, which was adaptively changed from
block to block, decreasing b by amount δ when the overall accu-
racy in that block was above 80% or incrementing it by δ when
accuracy fell below 65%. Three coherence levels were used, equal
to b, 2b, and 4b. In the ﬁrst session, the baseline coherence was
initially set to 12% and δ was set to 1.6%; for later sessions, the
initial value of b was determined based on the last block from
the previous session, and δ was set to 0.86% (this value changes
the average coherence by 2%). For example, if in a given block in
session 2 or later, the coherence levels were 5, 10, and 20%, and
performance fell below 65% correct, the resulting coherence levels
would be set to 5.86, 11.72, and 23.44%.
Observers. Three participants with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision were tested in 5 (AP) or 10 (CB, SY) 1-h sessions
over several weeks. We intended to run each participant for 10
sessions, treating the ﬁrst three as practice and for stabilization
of coherence levels, and analyzing the results from the remain-
ing seven sessions. However, participant AP stopped participating
after ﬁve sessions. Rather than exclude the participant completely,
we excluded only the ﬁrst session of this participant, leaving four
sessions for inclusion in the analysis.
COMPUTATIONAL METHODS
The LCA and BD models were simulated as two-layered neural
networks illustrated in Figures 1A,B respectively. The simulation
of the LCA model was based on the following ﬁnite difference
equations3:
Δx1 = I1 − kx1 − βx2 + I0 + N (0,σ) ; (1)
Δx2 = I2 − kx2 − βx1 + I0 + N (0,σ) ,
subject to a lower bound on activation at 0:
x1 (t + 1) = max (0, x1 (t ) + Δx1) ;
x2 (t + 1) = max (0, x2 (t ) + Δx2) .
3These equations correspond to discrete versions of the differential Equations dx1 =
dt
[
I ′1 − k ′x1 − β′x2 + I ′0
]+N (0, σ′)√dt ; dx2 = dt
[
I ′2 − k ′x2 − β′x1 + I ′0
]+
N
(
0, σ′
)√
dt with the following correspondences with the parameters in the ﬁnite
difference equations: I1 = I ′1 dt , I2 = I ′2 dt , I0 = I ′0 dt , k = k ′ dt , β =
β′ dt , and σ = σ′√dt . In the simulations, dt = 0.0035 s (3.5ms) and the reported
parameter values are those in the ﬁnite difference equations.
www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 79 | 5
Tsetsos et al. Time-varying evidence probes decision dynamics
In Eq. 1, Δ represents a change or increment in the adjacent vari-
able, I 0 is a baseline input, k and β stand for the leak and the lateral
inhibition and N (0, σ) stands for normally distributed noise of
standard deviation σ. The output of the max function is equal to
its second argument when this is positive and is equal to 0 oth-
erwise. This max function introduces non-linearity to the system
that prevents x1 or x2 from becoming negative.
In time-controlled paradigms such as the one used here and in
Kiani et al. (2008), in which a decision is called for by presenting
a go cue, the model assigns the decision to the most active accu-
mulator a short time after the go cue occurs as discussed further
below.
The simulation of the BD model was based on
Δx1 = I1 + N (0,σ) ; (2)
Δx2 = I2 + N (0,σ) ,
The decision variables are y1 = x1 − x2, and y2 = x2 − x1.
In BD, information integration is subject to a bound, even in
time-controlled paradigms. When the activation of one of the
accumulators, y1 or y2, corresponding to the difference between
the integrated evidence for the two alternatives, in Eq. 2, reaches
the bound, the race ends and the more active unit at that time
wins the trial. If the bound is not reached, the model assigns the
decision to the most active accumulator a short time after the go
cue occurs, as in the LCA.
Shared parameters
The noise strength was set at σ = 0.1 in both models. The inputs
to the units were I 1 = c × s, and I 2 = 0, where c stands for the
coherence level and where sensitivity, s, is a free parameter ﬁtted
for eachmodel. All simulations employed an integration time step
of 3.5ms.
The experimentswewill report involve presenting a visual stim-
ulus at some time t = 0 and then presenting a response signal or
“go cue” at a variable time post stimulus onset. Responses are
considered to be triggered by the go cue. Thus, the time between
the stimulus onset and the presentation of the go cue – the go
cue delay – could be taken as the duration of the information
integration period. In relating both models to experimental data,
however, we included a “dead-time” parameter, T 0, to allow for
the possibility that the presentation of an imperative signal to
respond terminates evidence integration before all the evidence
actually presented up to that time has been integrated. Previous
research has established that evidence accumulation in area LIP
lags behind the actual presentation of the visual evidence by about
200ms (Mazurek et al., 2003; Rorie et al., 2010). If the go cue can
terminate evidence accumulation with a shorter lag,T g < 200ms,
then the total time available for evidence integration would be
equal to the go cue delay less the difference between T g and 200.
The parameter T 0 represents this difference (200−T g) and is
assumed to be greater than or equal to 0.
Model speciﬁc parameters: bounded diffusion
In addition to the parameters already mentioned, the BD model
had one additional parameter, the position of the decision bound,
A. The value of A was assumed to take a single ﬁxed value for each
participant, independently of the coherence level of the stimulus or
the trial duration, since all levels of both variables were randomly
intermixed and therefore unpredictable from trial to trial.
Model speciﬁc parameters: LCA
The LCA model was implemented with two additional free para-
meters that were optimized to ﬁt the data, namely the leak and
inhibition strengths k and β. The LCA also includes a parameter
representing the common input to the two accumulators, I 0,which
was set at I 0 = 0.2 in ﬁtting themodel to all participants. This para-
meter determines how likely it is that the activation bound of zero
is reached by the losing accumulator in the LCA. The particular
value was chosen on the basis of exploratory simulations so that
this boundary is often but not always reached on longer trials, and
was not otherwise adjusted in ﬁtting data from individual par-
ticipants in our experiments. This parameter had different values
in the simulation studies; the values are explicitly reported in the
relevant sections below.
Simulation protocol
According to the protocol of experiment 1B (see Experimental
Methods), there were four levels of motion coherencies (c = 6.4,
12.8, 25.6, 51.2%) and four different timing conditions (constant,
early, late, and switch). Since we have less data for the switch condi-
tion,which occurred onlywith the two lowest coherences,we ﬁtted
the models based on the constant, early, and late conditions and
used the optimized parameters to predict the choice preference in
the switch condition. Assuming that unit one is supported by the
stimulus and unit two is not supported, the inputs in the three
conditions were assigned in the following way. In the constant
condition I 1 = c × s, I 2 = 0 throughout the entire trial. In the early
condition I 1 = c × s, I 2 = 0 for the ﬁrst half of the trial and I 1 = 0,
I 2 = 0 for the second half. In the late condition, I 1 = 0, I 2 = 0
for the ﬁrst half and I 1 = c × s, I 2 = 0 for the second half. The
durations of the simulation trials were sampled from an exponen-
tial distribution with a mean of μ= 243 simulation time-steps, or
850ms. The minimum duration was set at 43 time-steps (150ms)
and the maximum at 500 time-steps (1750ms). The trials were
grouped in quartiles according to stimulus durations, resulting in
48 conditions (4 coherencies× 3 conditions× 4 durations).
Optimization procedure
The best ﬁtting parameters of the models were obtained by an
optimization procedure performed on the 48 (4 coherencies× 3
timing conditions× 4 durations) mean accuracy scores of each
participant. For presentation purposes we averaged the experi-
mental data and the ﬁts across the four coherency levels. Assuming
that the correct responses follow a binomial distribution, we can
compute the likelihood of a model given the N = 48 experimen-
tal conditions as: L = ∏Ni (niyi )pyii (1 − pi)ni−yi , where N = 48 is
the number of data points, ni is the number of trials for the i-th
data point, yi is the corresponding number of correct responses
and pi the probability of correct response predicted by the model.
The cost function we minimized was the negative logarithm of
L, i.e., −LL=−loge(L). For optimization we used the SUBPLEX
minimization routine (Bogacz and Cohen, 2004), which extends
the multi-dimensional simplex algorithm in order to better han-
dle noisy functions for simulation-based models. For each subject
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and each model we ran the optimization 200 times with starting
points randomly sampled from uniform distributions within a
parameter-speciﬁc range. At that stage, each predicted data point
was generated from 1000 simulated trials.We re-evaluated each of
these 200 ﬁts by running more iterations of the model with the
best ﬁtting parameters (10,000 simulated trials per data point). At
the ﬁnal reﬁnement stage, the parameters of the best ﬁt (after the
re-evaluation of the 200 parameter sets) were used as the start-
ing point of one last run of the SIMPLEX routine, using 2000
simulated trials per data point.
In order to compare the quantitative ﬁts of the two models we
used the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which takes into
account both the goodness of ﬁt and the complexity of the model.
The BIC penalizes the extra free parameters much more strongly
than other similar measures such as the Akaike information cri-
terion. The BIC is computed as: −2LL+ P1n(N ), where P is the
number of the free parameters of the model, N the number of
data points and LL is as deﬁned above. For Figure 7 and for the
calculation of BIC values, themodels were run with the best ﬁtting
parameters for 100,000 simulated trials per data point.
RESULTS
We start with a computational investigation showing that the
LCA model can capture all three of the patterns seen in Experi-
ment 2 of Usher and McClelland (2001), namely primacy, recency
and perfect balance. We also demonstrate that the LCA model
with moderate inhibition dominance predicts a transition from
primacy-to-recency as the duration of the trial increases. Follow-
ing the computational investigations, we present the experimental
results.
CONTRASTING BOUNDED DIFFUSION AND LEAKY INTEGRATION: A
SIMULATION STUDY
For binary choices, the LCA is a stochastic two-dimensional system
described by two variables x1 and x2, each corresponding to the
accumulated evidence for one of the two alternatives. Each accu-
mulator is updated at every simulation time step according to Eq.
1 presented in Section “Materials and Methods,” and reproduced
here for convenience:
Δx1 = I1 − kx1 − βx2 + I0 + N (0,σ) ; (1)
Δx2 = I2 − kx2 − βx1 + I0 + N (0,σ) .
As noted in the Section “Materials and Methods,” the values of x1
and x2 were subject to a lower bound on activation at 0.
When x1 and x2 are both positive, the LCA dynamics stay in
the linear regime. Since decisions are based only on which of the
two decision variables is more active, we only need to examine the
difference between them: x = x1 − x2. In this case, LCA is reduced
to the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) diffusion process (Busemeyer
and Townsend, 1993; Usher and McClelland, 2001):
Δx = I − (k − β) x + N
(
0,
√
2σ
)
(3)
where I = I 1 − I 2. When leak exceeds inhibition, the activation
difference x is characterized by leaky accumulating dynamics. Both
the mean and the standard deviation of x stop changing once the
net leak [equal to (k − β)x] in Eq. 3 becomes equal in magnitude
to the input term I. The left column in Figure 3 demonstrates how
the distribution of x evolves with time. The resulting accuracy,
which corresponds to the area of the distribution to the right of
the vertical neutral line, therefore also levels off at an asymptotic
value. Since evidence that arrives early has a longer time to leak
away than the information that arrives late, late information over-
weighs early information under these circumstances, causing the
recency effect.
On the other hand, when inhibition dominates leak in the full
model, k < β, the quantity (k − β) in Eq. 3 becomes negative; tak-
ing this together with the minus sign in front of the (k − β)x term,
we see that net effect of leak and inhibition becomes self excitation.
In that case, any difference between the two decision variables will
grow and explode with time. See Figure 3, middle column. Since
early evidence has more time to grow than late information, early
evidence overweighs late information in determining decisions,
causing primacy. Although the mean and the standard deviation
of the distribution in this condition both grow without bound as
time increases, the resulting choice probability, determined by the
ratio between the two, evolves and levels off with time in the same
way in this condition as in the leak-dominant condition (see Usher
and McClelland, 2001; Gao et al., 2011 for more details). Finally,
when leak and inhibition are in perfect balance, k = β, neither leak
nor self excitation occurs. The (k − β)x term disappears from Eq.
3, and the model behaves as the drift-diffusion model (Bogacz
et al., 2006; this case is not illustrated in the ﬁgure).
Non-linearity comes into play in the inhibition-dominant
regime. According to the linear version of the LCA in Equation 3,
the self excitation drives the evidence difference, x, to inﬁnity with
time. However, in the full LCA model, including the non-linearity
at 0, once the losing unit’s activation reaches 0, it stops going
further down and stops sending any inhibitory signal. The activ-
ity of the winning unit will be driven only by its leak and by its
input (I 1 or I 2 depending on which unit is the winner). There-
fore its activity, as well as the difference between its activity, levels
off as further time passes. Figure 3, right column demonstrates
the dynamics of the evidence difference variable x in this situa-
tion. Although the detailed dynamic of x in the non-linear model
differs from that in the linear version, the choice probability dis-
tributions for the two models are very similar. This is because the
non-linearity takes effect only after some time has passed. By this
time, the ampliﬁcation of early signals has already exerted its inﬂu-
ence on the outcome (Usher and McClelland, 2001). Therefore, in
the inhibition-dominant regime, both the full non-linear LCA and
the linearized LCA produce a primacy pattern.
To illustrate the recency and primacy effects exhibited by the
leak and inhibition-dominant LCAwe performed the same reverse
correlation analysis as in Figure 2, comparing leak-dominant
and inhibition-dominant LCA with the BD model (Figure 4).
Both alternatives (left/right) received noisy input for 200 sim-
ulation time-steps (Gaussian values with zero mean and SD of
0.1). BD was simulated with A = 0.8, inhibition-dominant LCA
with k = 0.05, β= 0.095, I 0 = 0.1 and leak-dominant LCA with
k = 0.05, β= 0.025, I 0 = 0.1. Larger differences between the left
choice activity curve (blue) and the right choice activity curve
www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 79 | 7
Tsetsos et al. Time-varying evidence probes decision dynamics
−2 0 2
D
en
sit
y
k=0.02, inhibition=0
0 5 10
k=−0.02, inhibition=0
−2 0 2
k=0.02, inhibition=0.04
−2 0 2
D
en
sit
y
0 5 10 −2 0 2
−2 0 2
x1−x2
D
en
sit
y
0 5 10
x1−x2
−2 0 2
x1−x2
t=10 t=10 t=10 
t=50t=50 t=50 
t=195 t=100 t=195
Time
FIGURE 3 |Time evolution of the decision variable x =x 1 −x 2 in three different leak-inhibition conditions. Adapted with permission from Usher and
McClelland (2001).
(red) at the beginning of the trial indicates primacy, while larger
differences at the end indicates recency.Figure 4demonstrates that
although the leak-dominant LCA (Figure 4C) results in recency,
the inhibition-dominant LCA results in primacy (Figure 4B). The
behavioral results reported in Kiani et al. (2008), although incon-
sistent with the leak-dominant LCA, are thus shown to be consis-
tent with either the BD model or the inhibition-dominant LCA.
The rich dynamics of the LCAmodel also allows it, with certain
settings of its parameters, to produce a transition between pri-
macy and recency. In Figure 5A, we demonstrate such a case with
the following values of the leak, inhibition and baseline parame-
ters: k = 0.172, β= 0.748, I 0 = 0.095, and σ = 0.1. We simulated a
switch trial, where the motion coherence stays constant in magni-
tude throughout the trial but the direction switches in the middle.
Inputs are I 1 = 0.026, I 2 = 0 for the ﬁrst half of the trial and I 1 = 0,
I 2 = 0.026 for the second half. We plot the probability of choices
supported by the early half of the trial. A value above 0.5 implies
early information determines the ﬁnal decision more often than
late information, i.e., primacy, and a value below 0.5 implies early
information determines decisions less often than late information,
i.e., recency. Each data point is based on simulations of 30,000 tri-
als, andﬁve durationswere used consisting of 71,157,243,329, and
414 time-steps. One can see a transition from primacy to recency
as stimulus duration increases.
In order to explain how the transition results from the LCA,
we show activations of the two accumulators in a typical trial in
Figure 5B. The red curve stands for the alternative supported in
the ﬁrst half of the trial, and the blue curve for the one supported
in the second half. When stimulus duration is short (top panel),
the accumulator associated with the red curve wins because the
input during the ﬁrst half of the trial leads it to suppress the other
alternative, which does not have a chance to recover after the evi-
dence reverses. At the time of the switch, the early-supported (red)
accumulator is sending strong inhibition to the other accumula-
tor (blue curve). Although the blue accumulator is supported by
the stimulus input in the second half of the trial, its activation
grows very slowly, rising only after the red accumulator’s activa-
tion has sufﬁciently decayed. This takes long enough so that the
blue accumulator does not have a chance to win out. When stim-
ulus duration is long (bottom panel, solid lines), the activity of
the blue accumulator reaches zero well before the switch and stays
pinned at this value. Following that, the activity of the red curve
levels off; it no longer receives any inhibition from the other accu-
mulator, but its activation levels off due to the effect of the leak.
Therefore, although the ﬁrst half of the trial in this case is much
longer than that in the short duration scenario, the activity levels
of the two accumulators are similar at the time of the switch. After
the switch, the two curves evolve with time in the same manner as
they do in the top panel. However, in this case, the activation of the
red accumulator hasmore time to decay. The activation of the blue
accumulator has more time to grow and its activation eventually
comes to surpass the activation of the red alternative. Note that
this transition from primacy to recency is caused by the interplay
between the non-linearity at zero and the greater weight to early
evidence caused by inhibition dominance. It does not occur in the
linear case (dashed lines, lower panel of Figure 5B), nor does it
occur with a high level of inhibition dominance.
In summary, primacy bias is consistent with both the BD and
the inhibition-dominant LCA. However, LCA is also consistent
with recency or balanced weighting of early vs. late evidence. A
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short (top) and long (bottom). Red denotes the alternative supported in the
ﬁrst half of the trial, while blue denotes the alternative supported in the
second half. In the bottom panel, we also plotted out the simulation results
using the linear LCA (dashed lines).
distinctive signature of the non-linear inhibition-dominant LCA
is the transition fromprimacy at short durations to recency at long
durations with some parameter settings. In the following section,
we report the experimental ﬁndings of our studies, considering
whether they exhibit features consistent with the greater ﬂexibility
of the LCA.
EXPERIMENT 1A
The experiment followed theprocedures used inKiani et al. (2008),
as described in Section “Materials and Methods.” Observers were
asked to determine the predominant direction of moving dots.
While some dots were moving randomly, some were moving
coherently either to the left or to the right. As in Kiani et al., we
used four coherence levels and exponentially distributed stimulus
durations in the range 150–1750ms. Participants were trained to
respond within a window of 300ms following onset of the go cue
in order to earn points. The critical manipulation of the evidence
was applied in a subset of trials (80% of the trials with dura-
tions 300ms or longer), in the form of a 200ms “motion pulse”
corresponding to a change in coherence of ±3.2%.
All of the observers learned to respond within the 300ms
response window and their accuracy increasedwithmotion coher-
ence according to a sigmoidal function (results from participant
CS are shown in Figure 6A). As in Kiani et al. (2008), the pulse
resulted in a shift of the psychometric curves. A logistic regres-
sion was performed to measure the size of the horizontal shift in
units of coherence (see also Equation 4 in Kiani et al., 2008). Of
special interest is that the effect size of the shift dropped as the
pulse was applied later in the trial, indicating that early informa-
tion has a larger effect on choices. To quantify this, we considered
trials with durations of 700ms or more, and divided the trials into
three quantiles according to the time of the pulse (Figure 6C).
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FIGURE 6 | Results of experiment 1A with pulse perturbations. (A)The
pulse results in a shift in the observer’s psychometric function. As an
example, the result of CS is shown here. The percentage of rightward
choices is plotted against rightward coherence levels. The red curve
denotes rightward pulse and the blue curve denotes leftward pulse.
(B,C)The effect size of the shift varies with the time of the pulse. (C)The
psychometric function of participant CS as the pulse comes early,
intermediate and late in the trial. (B)The effect size of the pulse in the unit
of the equivalent motion coherence as a function of pulse time for all of
the three observers.
Figure 6B shows that this primacy pattern was present in all par-
ticipants, with some variability as the effect of the pulse weakens
in later quantiles.
EXPERIMENT 1B
Because the effect size in Experiment 1A is very small and there-
fore difﬁcult to quantify, Experiment 1Bwas carried out in order to
obtain amore robustmeasure of the temporalweightingproﬁle. To
do so, for each coherence and duration combination we created
four conditions: (i) the constant condition, in which coherence
stays ﬁxed throughout the entire trial, (ii) the early condition, in
which coherence is a ﬁxed non-zero value during the ﬁrst half of
the trial and zero during the second half, (iii) the late condition, in
which the coherence is zero in the ﬁrst half of the trial and is a ﬁxed
non-zero value during the second half, and (iv) the switch condi-
tion, in which the coherence stays constant in magnitude but the
direction of motion switches in the middle of the trial. The switch
condition occurred only with the two low coherence levels tomin-
imize the possibility of participants noticing the switch in motion
direction. It is expected that the constant condition will result in
higher choice accuracy, as it contains twice as much information
as the early/late conditions. There are two critical tests. The ﬁrst
one is the accuracy level in the early condition relative to that in
the late condition; and the second is the choice preference toward
the alternative supported in the ﬁrst half relative to that in the
second half in the switch condition. A primacy pattern means
higher accuracy in the early condition than in the late condition,
andmore choices toward the alternative supported in the ﬁrst half
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of the trial. Recency means the opposite. The observations are
shown in Figure 7.
In Figure 7A, the accuracy averaged across coherence levels
is displayed as a function of stimulus duration for the con-
stant (blue), early (black), and late (red) conditions for the three
observers. The results are also ﬁtted by the LCA (left panel) and
the BD (right panel) models. In all observers, accuracy increases
with stimulus duration and the accuracy in the constant condition
is higher than in the early and late conditions. More importantly,
accuracy in the early condition is higher than in the late condition,
implying a primacy effect. The size of the accuracy difference in
the two conditions, however, varies among the three observers.
It is very large in one of them (MT), who completely neglected
late evidence except in the shortest lag condition, but is smaller
in the other two. In SC, this difference also declines as stimulus
duration lengthens. The interaction between the recency-primacy
pattern and stimulus duration was consistent with the non-linear
LCA model, but it provides a challenge to the BD model as shown
below.
Quantitativemeasures of goodness of ﬁt are shown for the LCA
and BD models in Table 1. We used BIC, which takes the number
of degrees of freedom into account, tomeasure the goodness of ﬁt.
BD andLCAﬁt the data of CS andMTequally well,while LCApro-
vides a better ﬁt to the data from SC – the participant who showed
an interaction between the primacy effect and stimulus duration.
In Figure 7B, we plotted choice probabilities toward the alter-
native supported in the ﬁrst half of the trial. A value above 0.5
means primacy, while a value below 0.5 means recency. Consistent
with the results in the early/late conditions, the switch condition
also reveals a clear primacy in CS and MT, and this effect is par-
ticularly strong in MT. For SC, we see a primacy pattern when
stimulus duration is short, and it disappears and even reverses to
a recency pattern as the stimulus duration lengthens. Due to its
smaller data size, we did not use the switch condition in model
ﬁtting. Rather, we adopted the parameters from the ﬁtting of the
constant/early/late condition and plotted themodel predictions in
the switch condition (solid lines in Figure 7B). Again, bothmodels
ﬁt the ﬁrst two participants about equally well, but BD does not
ﬁt the data of SC as well as LCA does.
EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B
Both versions of Experiment 1 replicate the primacy bias reported
by Kiani et al. (2008). Since the results of Experiment 1B and the
data ﬁtting we conducted showed that it was not possible in two of
the three participants to discriminate the two models using ﬁts of
the data, we chose in our second set of experiments to focus on the
detection of the qualitative pattern of data that can discriminate
themodels (Figure 5).While this pattern only arises at a particular
set of LCA parameters, it is special because it goes against what a
BDmodel can predict. Inparticular,wewished to examinewhether
FIGURE 7 | Results of experiment 1B. (A) Accuracy as a function of
stimulus duration in the constant, early and late conditions. Left: Data
(symbols) and the leaky competing accumulator ﬁt (lines). Error bars
correspond to 95% CI. Right: Data and bounded diffusion ﬁt.
(B) Predictions of the leaky competing accumulator (cyan) and
bounded diffusion (magenta) in the switch condition. Parameters of the
models are from the ﬁtting in Panel A. Proportion of choices supported early
in the trial was plotted against stimulus duration. Error bars correspond to
95% CI. Larger error bars are due to smaller sample size in the switch
condition.
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Table 1 | Bayesian information criterion values and model parameters for the LCA and BD models for the three subjects in experiment 1B.
Participant BIC values Parameters
C-E-L SW LCA BD
LCA BD LCA BD β K s T 0 A s T 0
CS 355.5 355.0 99.3 97.6 0.037 0.034 0.05 12.61 2.50 0.06 17.09
MT 349.5 348.4 78.5 78.7 0.129 0.089 0.06 15.72 0.69 0.06 13.53
SC 350.7 397.7 92.9 155.7 0.028 0.029 0.08 20.19 5.76 0.08 27.33
C-E-L stands for constant-early-late conditions and SW for the switch condition. T0 values correspond to simulation time-steps.
any of the observers show a transition from primacy-to-recency,
which is a signature prediction of the non-linear LCA model and
is a challenge to the BD model.
A further goal of our second experiment is to examine if the
primacy bias observed in Experiment 1 can be reversed or attenu-
ated. Although the primacy bias seems to be a robust observation
(Kiani et al., 2008), it is possible that it may be task-dependent.
The time pressure in Experiment 1, is very high, to an extent that
is similar to, and perhaps even more extreme than that in Kiani
et al. (see text footnote 5). Under such circumstances, decision
makers presumably need to be ready to make a prompt response
when the go cue comes; this could promote either a lower decision
bound for the BD model or stronger lateral inhibition in the LCA.
In order to investigate this question, we relaxed the time pres-
sure in our remaining experiments. First, we relaxed the response
window after the go cue from 300ms to 1 s. This allowed observers
enough time to prepare their response after the go cue. Second, we
used uniformly distributed stimulus durations instead of expo-
nentially distributed durations. This way, long stimulus durations
are equally likely as short stimulus durations (see Discussion for
further consideration of this issue).
As in Experiment 1, each participant was tested for several ses-
sions to provide statistical power (see Materials and Methods). In
total seven observers were tested with this procedure. The ﬁrst
four participants were tested in Experiment 2A with stimulus
durations of 150–1750ms. After noticing that their accuracy levels
differed dramatically, we adapted the difﬁculty level individually
and employed a wider range of stimulus durations (150–2350ms)
for another three participants.
The results are summarized in Figure 8A. The average primacy
score, deﬁned as the average accuracy level in the early condi-
tion minus that in the late condition, drops dramatically from
Experiment 1B to Experiment 2A and 2B. Since there is no signif-
icant difference in procedure or results between the participants
in 2A and 2B, we collapse these two groups into one, and refer to
this as Experiment 2. The primacy score was signiﬁcantly larger
in Experiment 1B than in Experiment 2 [11 vs. 2%; t (8)= 2.98;
p < 0.02].While all the observers in the Experiment 1B showed the
primacy effect, there was considerable variation among observers
in the second group. We therefore conducted a subject-by-subject
ANOVA on the main effect of early vs. late and on the interac-
tion between the size of this effect and the stimulus duration.
To carry out this analysis, we divided the data of each observer
into mini-sessions or quasi-subjects that corresponded to all of
the session-by-coherence combinations. Each such quasi-subject
contributed an equal number of trials to the relevant dependent
variables of duration and condition (early vs. late), factoring out
the common variability related to fatigue,practice, or performance
levels. We thus subjected the mini-session data to a repeated-
measure (4× 2) ANOVA, with 4 levels of trial duration and 2
levels of timing within trial (early vs. late). The ANOVA results are
summarized in Table 2.
Table 2 revealed that only two of the seven observers (LK and
CB) showed a signiﬁcant main effect of primacy. More interest-
ingly, participant WW showed a signiﬁcant interaction between
temporal weighting and duration (Figure 8B). WW’s decisions
were mainly driven by early information when stimulus duration
was short, while they were driven by late information when stim-
ulus duration was long. This transition from primacy-to-recency
is a signature of the non-linear LCA model and it is not consis-
tent with the BD model. Please refer to the Appendix for detailed
individual data for all seven participants (Figure A3).
DISCUSSION
Stimulated by the recent study of Kiani et al. (2008),we have exam-
ined the temporal weighting of evidence in decision making using
a time-controlled protocol. In both of the testedmonkeys, Kiani et
al. foundaprimacybias – early informationwasmore important in
decisionmaking – and they proposed the BDmodel as the mecha-
nistic basis for this observation.According to thismodel, observers
make a decision when a decision bound is reached and ignore any
information afterward. In Experiment 1 we examined two types
of evidence manipulations: brief motion pulses (or perturbations;
see also Huk and Shadlen, 2005) and larger within trial evidence
changes at the middle of the stimulus duration. The two methods
gave similar results, indicating primacy, though the effect of the
latter manipulation was more robust. In our ﬁrst pair of experi-
ments (1A and 1B), we used a procedure with high time pressure,
similar to Kiani et al. In the second pair of experiments (2A and
2B), we relaxed the time pressure by allowing slower responses
after the go cue and by using relatively more long trials. Experi-
ments 1A and 1B replicated the primacy bias reported by Kiani et
al. while in Experiments 2A and 2B the primacy bias signiﬁcantly
diminished. With some participants, we also found that primacy
bias drops, or even transitions to recency (with a stronger weight
to late evidence relative to early evidence) as stimulus duration
lengthens. We showed that the LCA model can account for the
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FIGURE 8 | Results of experiment 2. (A) Primacy scores of all the
participants in experiments 2A and 2B in comparison to those in Experiment
1B. The primacy score is calculated as the accuracy in the early minus that in
the late condition, averaged across all coherences and all stimulus durations.
Red circles correspond to individual data. Error bars correspond to 1 SE.
(B) Accuracy as a function of stimulus duration for participantWW in
Experiment 2A. Constant, early, and late conditions are shown in blue, black,
and red respectively. Error bars correspond to 95% CI.
primacy bias as well as the BD model, and that it can also cap-
ture the transition from primacy to recency, a pattern that poses a
challenge to the BD model.
The LCA model does not assume the presence of a decision
bound in the time-controlled paradigm. In this model, accuracy
levels off due to the imbalance between the leak and the inhibition,
and the time scale of this process is determined by the absolute
value of the difference between the strength of the leak and the
strength of the inhibition. The sign of this difference, although it
does not affect the overall time-accuracy proﬁle, has a profound
effect on the relative weight of early vs. late evidence (Usher and
McClelland, 2001; Gao et al., 2011). Unlike in the leak-dominant
LCA, which gives a higher weight to late evidence, the inhibition-
dominant LCA gives a higher weight to early evidence. Thus, this
framework, as well as the attractor model (Wang, 2002)4, provides
an alternative to the BD model’s account of the primacy pattern.
The LCA and relatedmodels are also consistent with aspects of the
results of an earlier perturbation study byHuk andShadlen (2005).
In this study, the effect of a transient change in evidence on activity
in putative evidence accumulation neurons in area LIP is higher
when applied early during the observation interval, and becomes
very weak near the end (Huk and Shadlen, 2005; Figure 10B). The
authors attempted to ﬁt these results using the BD model and
noted that it did not explain the very weak impact of later pulses
on the neuron’s responses (p. 3027). These authors suggested the
attractor model of Wang (2002) as one mechanism that could
account for the residual effect. In Figure 9, we present an informal
simulation showing that the inhibition-dominant LCA can also
capture the pattern Huk and Shadlen (2005) found in their data.
Like neurons in LIP, the accumulators in the LCA are highly sen-
sitive to motion pulses occurring early in a stimulus presentation
period, and this effect becomes progressively weaker as integration
time continues.
4The attractor model was not directly simulated in relation to the tempo-
ral weighting of evidence, but we expect it to have similar predictions as the
inhibition-dominant LCA, as both have unstable Ornstein–Uhlenbeck dynamics.
Themain result of Experiment 2was a reduction in the primacy
bias, compared to Experiment 1. This difference in the temporal
weighting of evidence can be understood in relation to two pro-
cedural differences between the two experiments. The ﬁrst change
is that the response window was relaxed from 300 to 1000ms.
With a 300ms response window, participants must be prepared
to respond very quickly once the go cue comes. Under the BD
model, this time pressure could lead them to adopt a lower deci-
sion bound, so that they will be ready to respond when the go cue
occurs. Similarly, under the LCA, this time pressure could encour-
age adjusting the strength of lateral inhibition, since stronger
inhibition helps to encourage a difference in the activation of the
two accumulators, which may facilitate faster responding (Gao
et al., 2011; Gao and McClelland, in preparation). In any case,
time pressure may be one factor contributing to the strong pri-
macy pattern observed in our Experiment 1 and in Kiani et al.
(2008)5.
The second experimental change is that we used uniformly dis-
tributed stimulus durations rather than exponentially distributed
durations. The reason Kiani et al. (2008) used exponentially dis-
tributed stimulus durations was to ensure that observers have no
information about the time when the go cue would appear. This
choice, however, results in much more frequent short trials than
long trials. This factor could encourage participants to ensure they
are ready to respond early in the trial, a factor that could further
encourage a primacy bias. The empirical ﬁndings of our study
suggest two potential reasons why Kiani et al. found only pri-
macy while the study of Usher and McClelland (2001) found all
5We note that in Kiani et al. (2008), a delay period was included in half of the
trials after the stimulus offset. However, trials with and without delays were mixed
randomly within blocks, making it necessary for the animal to be ready to respond
promptly at the termination of the stimulus, which was very brief on many trials.
The response window was 500ms in Kiani et al. as compared with only 300ms in
our Experiment 1. We conducted a small experiment with a 500ms response win-
dow and found that the primacy bias was not distinguishable in the 500ms and the
300ms conditions.
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Table 2 | Results of ANOVA examining the effect of timing within trial
(early vs. late) and its interaction with trial duration for all
participants in experiments 2A and 2B.
Subject Main effect of early/late Interaction: duration×early/late
DG F (1, 63)=2.715; p =0.104 F (3, 63)=1.353; p =0.259
LK F (1, 75)=40.527; p<0.001 F (3, 75)=1.297; p =0.276
MM F (1, 99)=0.721; p =0.398 F (3, 99)=0.192; p =0.662
WW F (1, 43)=0.062; p =0.805 F (3, 43)=3.410; p=0.020
AP F (1, 11)=0.026; p =0.876 F (3, 11)=0.563; p =0.643
CB F (1, 20)=6.678; p=0.018 F (3, 20)=1.365; p =0.262
SY F (1, 20)=1.815; p =0.193 F (3, 20)= 0.55; p =0.650
The bold fonts highlight the places where the differences were statistically
signiﬁcant
three patterns of primacy, recency, and balanced integration. Like
in Experiment 2, participants in the Usher and McClelland study
were not presented with predominantly short stimuli, or a short
deadline. Our ﬁndings also suggest that time pressure, exerted by
a narrow response window and/or by more short trials, is one of
the factors determining the relative importance of information at
different time points.
The results of these experiments also show important indi-
vidual differences (see also Usher and McClelland, 2001). We
were particularly interested in examining whether observers show
a transition from primacy, when stimulus duration is short, to
recency, when stimulus duration is long. This signature prediction
of the inhibition-dominant LCA is challenging for the BD model.
Such a transition was found in the performance of subject WW
in Experiment 2A, and a similar pattern was found in observer
SC in Experiment 1B. Despite detecting the predicted signature of
the non-linear LCA, we believe that any conclusions at this stage
should be tentative, since they are only supported by the data from
2 of 10 participants.
Further experimentation with additional observers and exper-
imental protocols will be needed to more thoroughly examine
the relative merits of the BD and LCA models and to delineate
in more detail the conditions under which recency as well as
primacy patterns might be obtained. This is important because
a number of other experimental paradigms have shown recency
patterns (Pietsch and Vickers, 1997; Usher and McClelland, 2001;
Newell et al., 2009).Note also that herewe only examined temporal
weighting of perceptual evidence in a time-controlled paradigm.
Although more challenging (since one cannot plan a mid-point
evidence change when RT is under subject control), the examina-
tion of temporal evidence is also possible in the free-response par-
adigm. Recently, Zhou et al. (2009) have developed a sophisticated
perturbation protocol that can distinguish between a number of
competing choice-RT-models in conditions of high signal-to-nose
(low error-rate). Future work with such perturbation protocols as
well as with balanced or non-balanced evidence switches (e.g.,
40% left vs. 60% right) are vital to fully understand the details
of the mechanisms of decision making, as are investigations that
collect enough data per participant to reliably explore individual
differences.
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FIGURE 9 |The effect of a short pulse on the activation states of two
leaky competing accumulators, at different times in the trial. Each trial
lasted for 200 time-steps. The two accumulators received Gaussian inputs
with mean and standard deviation both equal to 1. The pulse was inserted
for 40 time-steps and increased the mean input to the target accumulator
by 1 unit. In the y -axis we plot the change that the pulse conferred to the
difference between the target and the non-target accumulator. The change
is calculated by subtracting the difference between the accumulators’
activity 40 time-steps after the offset of the pulse minus the activity
difference at the onset of the pulse. The effect diminishes as the time of
the pulse onset increases. The leaky competing accumulator model was
simulated with inhibition three times larger than the leakage (β=0.15,
k =0.05). Error bars correspond to 95% CI.
One additional factor that may explain the difference in tem-
poral proﬁle obtained in this study and that in Kiani et al. (2008),
compared to studies that showed recency effects is the degree of
practice. Practice is quite extensive in our studies as well as in the
Kiani study. One possibility, suggested by Brown and Heathcote
(2005), is that practice increases the efﬁciency of evidence accu-
mulation by reducing the effective leak. This factor could play a
role in the comparison between our Experiment 1 and 2 as well,
since participants in Experiment 1 had more practice, on average,
than those in Experiment 2.
Kiani et al. (2008) proposed that bounded integration is a
universal decision principle that applies not only to self-paced
decisions but also to tasks in which the duration of evidence accu-
mulation is controlled by the experimenter. The results we report
here, taken together with other studies showing recency effects,
suggest that this conclusion should be reconsidered. Interestingly,
one of the motivations suggested by Kiani and colleagues against
leaky integration was the idea that leaky integrationmight bemal-
adaptive in that it discards some of the evidence. While this may
be true in some conditions, it is also true that placing a bound
on information integration also disregards important decision-
relevant information6. It might be supposed that unbounded
6We do not argue against the idea that decision boundaries are sometimes used even
when the stimulus duration is experimentally controlled (Ratcliff, 2006). However,
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integration (achieved in thedrift-diffusionmodelwithout a bound
or by a linear version of the LCA with a perfect balance between
leak and inhibition) would always be the best policy, but this may
ignore important contingencies that could make a recency vs. a
primacy strategy more adaptive. These contingencies include the
need to be ready to respond quickly and the need to be sensitive
to a change in evidence as well as other factors.
We propose that the mechanism in play in the non-linear
inhibition-dominant LCA has the advantage of prioritizing early
information in a ﬂexible and reversible manner. Interestingly,while
the non-linearity reduces the optimality of the model in choices
between two alternatives, it has the advantage of making themech-
anism more optimal and robust when there is a larger number of
alternatives (Bogacz et al., 2007). In other work in our labs, this
mechanism is supported by data showing that responses triggered
by a go cue are faster for correct than incorrect choices (Gao and
McClelland, in preparation) and also by decision biases in favor
of alternatives whose evidence is temporally anti-correlated with
evidence for other alternatives (Tsetsos et al., 2011). Yet other work
indicates that someparticipants exhibit the bimodal decision states
like these exhibited by the inhibition-dominant LCA (as illustrated
in Figure 3, right column; Lachter et al., 2011).
we suspect that such boundaries should be under subject control, and reﬂect a vari-
ety of experimental demands (such as speed-accuracy trade-offs) and contingencies
(such as information about expected stimulus durations). Additionally, the bound
should be soft rather than rigid.
In closing, we suggest that the principles that are at play in the
LCA – leaky integration and lateral inhibition – may generalize
beyond the domain of evidence based decisions that we have
focused on here. These principles, inspired by known properties of
neural systems (Usher andMcClelland, 2001), are also found in the
attractor model of Wang (2002), and in models based on Decision
Field Theory, an approach that has been successfully applied to
various aspects of preference based decisions, such as risky choice
(Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005),
and to several distinctive characteristics of performance in multi-
attribute, multi-alternative decisions (Roe et al., 2001; Usher and
McClelland, 2004; Tsetsos et al., 2010).
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APPENDIX
PERTURBATION PROTOCOL IN EXPERIMENT 1A
In experiment 1A, a momentary change (or pulse) in the motion
coherence was introduced in 80% of the trials with duration
longer than 300ms. The motion pulse could be inserted between
100ms after the beginning of the stimulus and 200ms before it
ended. Figure A1 illustrates the perturbation protocol: T ms after
the stimulus onset (100ms<T <T overall − 200ms) the motion
coherence which previously equaled to a, increased by p (i.e.,
coherence level during the pulse was a + p, with p =±3.2%). The
duration of the pulse was ΔT = 200ms.
EXCLUDED SESSIONS IN EXPERIMENT 1B
For participants CS and MT the ﬁrst session was discarded due
to a programming mistake (see text footnote 2). Participants CS
and SC had high and stable mean accuracy for all sessions (SD of
accuracy was 2.2 and 3% respectively) and therefore we used 13
(after excluding the ﬁrst session) and 12 sessions correspondingly.
For participant MT the performance was unstable during the ﬁrst
10 sessions (see Figure A2). These sessions were not included in
the analysis, resulting in 9 analyzed sessions (the SD of accuracy
for the ﬁrst 10 sessions was 5%; after excluding these sessions SD
was 1.7% for the remaining 9 sessions).
INDIVIDUAL RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT 2A AND 2B
In Figure A3 the results of all participants (4 for Experiment 2A
and 3 for Experiment 2B) are presented. Table 2 in the main text
shows the statistical analysis performed on each subject regarding
the direction of the timing effect (primacy/recency) and its inter-
action with the trial duration. Participants LK and CB showed
a signiﬁcant primacy while participant WW showed a signiﬁ-
cant interaction between primacy/recency and trial duration. This
interaction is uniquely predicted by the LCA model (see Experi-
ment 1A). The patterns exhibited by the other participants do not
discriminate between the models.
FIGUREA1 | Illustration of perturbation protocol in Experiment 1B.
AfterT ms the motion coherence level changes from a to a +p for a
duration of 200ms.
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FIGUREA2 | Mean accuracy as a function of session for the three
subjects in Experiment 1B. For SC and CS, whose performance was
relatively high and stable, all sessions were maintained for the analysis. For
subject MT the sessions 1–10 (up to the red vertical line) were eliminated
because the participant’s accuracy was unstable.
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FIGUREA3 | Accuracy as a function of stimulus duration and condition
in Experiment 2A (participants DG, LK, MM, andWW) and Experiment
2B (adaptive condition; participants AP, CB, and SY). Error bars
correspond to 95% CI.
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